SAME OLD THING
Although the contention being addressed in the following is necessity vs. contingency, and the issue on the AAA is natural vs supernatural/humanism vs theism, with a seasoning of the proper representation of each, and the discussion being presented from a considerably different level of expertise, the manor and nature of argumentation is apparently little different —the passage of, just less than, 300 years also having had little effect.
I started to highlight the points of similarity which I saw, but did not; thinking it better to allow each reader to draw their own parallels and conclusions.
Edwards, Freedom of the Will, Conclusion, 1st paragraph:
Whether the things which have been alleged are liable to any tolerable answer, in the ways of calm, intelligible, and strict reasoning, I must leave others to judge; but I am sensible they are liable to one sort of answer. It is not unlikely, that some, who value themselves on the supposed rational and generous principles of the modern fashionable divinity, will have their indignation and disdain raised at the sight of this discourse, and on perceiving what things are pretended to be approved in it. And if they think it worthy of being read, or of so much notice as to say much about it, they may probably renew the usual exclamations, with additional vehemence an contempt, about the fate of the heathen, Hobbes’s necessity, and making men mere machines; accumulating the terrible epithets of fatal, unfrustrable, inevitable, irresistible, &c., and it may be, with the addition of horrid and blasphemous; and perhaps much skill may be used to set forth things, which have been said, in colours which shall be shocking to the imaginations, and moving to the passions, of those who have either too little capacity, or too much confidence of the opinions they have imbibed, and contempt of the contrary, to try the matter by any serious and circumspect examination.* Or, difficulties may be started and insisted on, which do not belong to the controversy; because let them be more or less real, and hard to be resolved, they are not what are owing to any thing distinguishing of this scheme from that of the Arminians, and would not be removed nor diminished by renouncing the former, and adhering to the latter. Or, some particular things may be picked out, which they may think will sound harshest in the ears of the generality; and these may be glossed and descanted on, with tart and contemptuous word; and from thence, the whole treated with triumph and insult.
*A writer of the present age, whom I have several times had occasion to mention, speaks once and again of those who hold the doctrine of necessity, as scarcely worthy of the name of philosophers. I do not know whether he has respect to any particular notion of necessity, that some may have maintained; and, if so, what doctrine of necessity it is that he means. Whether I am worthy of the name of a philosopher, or not, would be a question little to the present purpose. If any, and ever so many, should deny it, I should not think it worth the while to enter into a dispute on the question: though, at the same time, I might expect some better answer should be given to the arguments brought for the truth of the doctrine I maintain; and I might further reasonably desire, that it might be considered, whether it does not become those who are truly worthy of the name of philosophers, to be sensible that there is a difference between argument and contempt; yea, and a difference between the contemptibleness of the person that argues, and the inconclusiveness of the augments he offers.
Although the contention being addressed in the following is necessity vs. contingency, and the issue on the AAA is natural vs supernatural/humanism vs theism, with a seasoning of the proper representation of each, and the discussion being presented from a considerably different level of expertise, the manor and nature of argumentation is apparently little different —the passage of, just less than, 300 years also having had little effect.
I started to highlight the points of similarity which I saw, but did not; thinking it better to allow each reader to draw their own parallels and conclusions.
Edwards, Freedom of the Will, Conclusion, 1st paragraph:
Whether the things which have been alleged are liable to any tolerable answer, in the ways of calm, intelligible, and strict reasoning, I must leave others to judge; but I am sensible they are liable to one sort of answer. It is not unlikely, that some, who value themselves on the supposed rational and generous principles of the modern fashionable divinity, will have their indignation and disdain raised at the sight of this discourse, and on perceiving what things are pretended to be approved in it. And if they think it worthy of being read, or of so much notice as to say much about it, they may probably renew the usual exclamations, with additional vehemence an contempt, about the fate of the heathen, Hobbes’s necessity, and making men mere machines; accumulating the terrible epithets of fatal, unfrustrable, inevitable, irresistible, &c., and it may be, with the addition of horrid and blasphemous; and perhaps much skill may be used to set forth things, which have been said, in colours which shall be shocking to the imaginations, and moving to the passions, of those who have either too little capacity, or too much confidence of the opinions they have imbibed, and contempt of the contrary, to try the matter by any serious and circumspect examination.* Or, difficulties may be started and insisted on, which do not belong to the controversy; because let them be more or less real, and hard to be resolved, they are not what are owing to any thing distinguishing of this scheme from that of the Arminians, and would not be removed nor diminished by renouncing the former, and adhering to the latter. Or, some particular things may be picked out, which they may think will sound harshest in the ears of the generality; and these may be glossed and descanted on, with tart and contemptuous word; and from thence, the whole treated with triumph and insult.
*A writer of the present age, whom I have several times had occasion to mention, speaks once and again of those who hold the doctrine of necessity, as scarcely worthy of the name of philosophers. I do not know whether he has respect to any particular notion of necessity, that some may have maintained; and, if so, what doctrine of necessity it is that he means. Whether I am worthy of the name of a philosopher, or not, would be a question little to the present purpose. If any, and ever so many, should deny it, I should not think it worth the while to enter into a dispute on the question: though, at the same time, I might expect some better answer should be given to the arguments brought for the truth of the doctrine I maintain; and I might further reasonably desire, that it might be considered, whether it does not become those who are truly worthy of the name of philosophers, to be sensible that there is a difference between argument and contempt; yea, and a difference between the contemptibleness of the person that argues, and the inconclusiveness of the augments he offers.